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A mechanism to restructure the debt of an insolvent euro country is a missing element in the 
emerging institutional architecture of the euro area. The introduction of an insolvency proce-
dure for sovereigns faces a dilemma: In the foreseeable future, its introduction would risk 
pushing Europe back into acute crisis. But the indefinite postponement of reform would im-
pair the credibility of a future regime change. Against this background, this paper reviews 
arguments and existing blueprints for sovereign insolvency procedures in the euro area and 
develops a “Viable Insolvency Procedure for Sovereigns” (VIPS). VIPS avoids any sudden 
measures which could destabilize the present fragile situation but carefully designs an irre-
versible transition towards the new regime. The VIPS proposal comprises two pillars: An in-
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The euro area debt crisis has revealed serious flaws in the institutional setup of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) as it had been designed in the late 1990s (Buti and Carnot, 2012; 
Hodson, 2013). Although the establishment of a common currency was a step towards more 
integration of financial and banking markets, supervision remained national. Although the 
common currency inherently had increased the fragility of government bond markets for self-
fulfilling default expectations (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012), no lender of last resort has been 
identified. And although one member’s unsustainable fiscal policy implies high costs for all 
countries of a currency area, national budgetary decisions had been left effectively uncon-
strained.  
In 2010, the crisis started a wave of sometimes hasty reforms to adjust this deficient setting. 
The temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the permanent European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) are new multilateral loan facilities created with the intention of 
stabilizing the government bonds market in the euro area (European Central Bank, 2011; Oli-
vares-Caminal, 2011). A key element of this reform program is the development of the bank-
ing union. It includes a single supervisory mechanism (Howarth and Quaglia, forthcoming) 
and bank resolution systems (European Commission, 2014). In addition, the European Central 
Bank partially assumed responsibility of a lender of last resort in case of government bond 
market panics and established the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program (European 
Central Bank, 2012b). EFSF, ESM and OMT all offer liquidity assistance which is condition-
al on far reaching consolidation and reform efforts undertaken by the debtor. Finally, the fee-
ble and ineffective Stability and Growth Pact was reformed, specified and complemented with 
national debt brakes, which all euro area member states have accepted by signing the Europe-
an Fiscal Compact (European Central Bank, 2012a; Burret and Schnellenbach, 2014). 
While this reform program is comprehensive, another serious incompleteness strikes: Until 
today, there is no well-defined and feasible insolvency procedure, which could be applied to 
restructure the sovereign debt of a euro area member state. This lack of a well-defined insol-
vency procedure remains a much neglected subject in the emerging new institutional structure 
of the euro area in at least two respects. 
First, the conditionality claim of EFSF, ESM and OMT loans can only be credible, if creditors 
have a real alternative to keeping a crisis country liquid under any circumstances. As long as 
the prospect of restructuring remains an unacceptable high-risk scenario any threat to stop 
loans (EFSF/ESM) or bond purchases (OMT) in case of non-compliance lacks credibility. In 
this case, public creditors are forced to give fresh money even to an insolvent country and 
even to a country which does not comply with conditions for help. This line of reasoning 
leads to a disturbing explanation for the calming of government bond markets in the Eurozone 
since the establishment of the OMT program in 2012: The decline of yield spreads may be 
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partially explained by the expectation that, with the ESM and the OMT, the euro area now has 
effectively established bailout-institutions for future insolvencies.  
Only a credible restructuring prospect can prevent a system, which is intended to merely pro-
vide conditional liquidity assistance in the short run and serve as a precaution against self-
fulfilling crises, from turning into a system of potentially unconditional permanent transfers 
(Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform, 2013). In this sense, the estab-
lishment of an insolvency procedure should not be seen as a minor technical decision. It is a 
necessary complement to ESM’s and ECB’s liquidity assistance by preventing this assistance 
from degenerating into a transfer system. In fact, this issue amounts to nothing less than the 
constitutional decision on whether the euro area countries form a transfer union based on full 
bailout-out guarantees or not. 
Second and closely related, the prospect of sovereign insolvency is crucial to safeguard mar-
ket discipline as a complement to rule based fiscal discipline. If the restructuring of single 
euro area member states’ debt is no realistic option, creditors hardly face any default risk 
when lending money to these borrowers. Governments would then have the privilege of a 
highly elastic credit supply at interest rates which reflect the creditworthiness of the euro area 
as a whole. The resulting low risk spreads induce highly indebted countries to run even fur-
ther into debt because debt, from their perspective, is relatively cheap. Only the realistic pos-
sibility of some kind of sovereign default can induce borrowers to carefully examine credit-
worthiness of euro area countries before buying their bonds. The ongoing establishment of the 
European Banking Union will further weaken market discipline as it relieves member states 
of their financial responsibility for the national banking systems and improves their sovereign 
creditworthiness. Therefore, there is an even growing need to revitalize market discipline 
through a clear perspective on the possibility of sovereign insolvency. 
While there is a strong case for an insolvency procedure for sovereigns in a newly designed 
EMU setup, its introduction is challenging. The financial and economic situation in the euro 
area will remain fragile for a considerable period of time as a consequence of the crisis. Alt-
hough the panic-driven turbulences at the euro area bond markets have receded since 2012 
(also due to ECB involvement), there is a permanent risk of sliding back into acute crisis and 
contagion. Debt-to-GDP ratios have not yet even started to decline in the crisis countries, their 
growth outlook remains weak and they have only just started to catch up in terms of interna-
tional competitiveness.1 In this situation, the introduction of a detailed and credible insolven-
                                                 
1 Further risks emanate from current legal uncertainties related to the consistency of the OMT program with EU 
primary law and a related case at the German Federal Constitutional Court. The German Constitutional Court has 
submitted the case to the European Court of Justice in January 2014. The German Court raised substantial doubts 
whether the OMT is covered by the monetary competencies of the ECB (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2014). A 
possible outcome could be that limits must be set with respect to the extent of the bond purchasing program, 
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cy procedure could be seen as a signal for an imminent restructuring, which might trigger a 
new flight from peripheral government bond markets. Thus, there is an underlying dilemma 
with respect to the introduction of any sovereign insolvency procedure (Mody, 2013): Calm 
and stable years would offer ideal conditions to establish transparent restructuring rules. But it 
is only during acute debt crises that the need for such rules is recognized. 
Our proposal of a “Viable Insolvency Procedure for Sovereigns” (VIPS) takes this dilemma 
seriously. It builds on the existing models (surveyed below) for the euro area but develops 
them further with a particular focus on the transition problem. It designs a reform path based 
on lagged implementation which could overcome the dilemma described. 
On the one hand, VIPS takes a cautious approach and avoids any sudden measures which 
could further destabilize the present fragile situation. Full effectiveness of the procedure is 
delayed until important objectives for the new institutional set-up have been achieved and a 
more solid market environment (including a stabilized banking system, a functioning banking 
union, and progress in cutting back public indebtedness) has been created. On the other hand, 
VIPS comprises immediate decisions and the beginning phasing-in of institutional adjust-
ments which are to make the (later) full introduction of the insolvency procedure irreversible.2 
Thus, VIPS makes use of the crisis related problem awareness and reform momentum to initi-
ate a far reaching institutional innovation but tries to minimize the risks in the immediate af-
termath of the crisis. In addition, delayed implementation may allow countries to at least par-
tially abstract from their own narrow interests. 
In the next section we will discuss why, under the specific conditions of EMU, a well-defined 
insolvency procedure is preferable to flexible ad hoc solutions. Subsequently, we review ex-
isting models for sovereign insolvency procedures with a focus on those developed for the 
euro area. Section 4 describes VIPS’ long-run elements and section 5 its transition path, fol-
lowed by a conclusion in section 6. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
which could raise doubts in the markets that the ECB can be an effective lender of last resort for euro area gov-
ernments. 
2 Renegotiation can of course never be ruled out but reversing an agreement on the introduction of an insolvency 
procedure under conditions specified today would at least be difficult since a later change of the ESM Treaty 
would require an unanimous decision. Single countries could decide unilaterally to leave the ESM Treaty but this 
would cut them off any potential ESM loans. 
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 2. Ad hoc solutions versus pre-defined procedures 
The history of public debt (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008) and the more recent experience with 
the European debt crisis clearly showed that sovereign countries may end up in a situation of 
insolvency.3 There are two essentially different ways to deal with fundamentally insolvent 
members of the euro area:4 Either a bailout is organized through (open or hidden) transfers 
from other euro area members or debt has to be restructured. So far EU law has explicitly 
excluded bailouts but, at the same time, has shown no explicit interest in other options. Negat-
ing a transfers-solution without offering a perspective on debt restructuring is a major incon-
sistency in the institutional framework of the euro area.  
However, although the restructuring of public debt is not explicitly mentioned in EU law, it is 
not forbidden either. In fact, in the case of Greece in 2012, there was a substantial private sec-
tor involvement (PSI) (Zettelmeyer, Trebesch and Gulati, 2013). The Greek experience 
demonstrates that the restructuring option actually is available. However, there is no well-
defined procedure. Hence, the question emerges whether the euro area needs detailed institu-
tional solutions to arrange future restructurings or whether it is sufficient to rely on ad hoc 
solutions. 
Opponents to statutory insolvency procedures argue that an insolvency procedure would un-
duly limit market participants. Creditors and sovereign debtors would have incentives to joint-
ly find a suitable solution, which would take account of the individual characteristics of each 
single case (Gianviti et al., 2010). According to this view, the recommendation of non-
binding „Codes of Good Conduct“ for creditors and borrowers or an agreement on collective 
action clauses (CAC) in bond contracts should be sufficient. However, solely relying on ad 
hoc solutions brings about challenges, which the proponents of euro area insolvency proce-
dures stress (see for similar reasoning Gianviti et al., 2010; Committee on International Eco-
nomic Policy and Reform, 2013; Mody, 2013): 
Nowadays, public debt is predominantly financed through bonds which are held by a large 
number of very diverse and dispersed investors. This makes ad hoc-negotiations between the 
borrower and the numerous creditors difficult and time consuming. Collective-action-
problems are notorious in this context. A first problem of that kind is related to the downward 
dynamics in an acute debt crisis: Without an insolvency procedure which equates losses for 
                                                 
3 If one accepts the notion that multiple equilibria can drive solvent countries into illiquidity this insight does not 
negate the possibility of fundamental insolvency. However, the empirical distinction between illiquidity in a 
“bad” equilibrium and fundamental insolvency is difficult in reality. An insolvency procedure has to deal with 
this difficulty. VIPS takes account of this challenge through its “shelter period”, see section 4.  
4 In principle, there are further available options: generating a surprise inflation which erodes the real value of 
debt or “financial repression” through privileged or forced access of governments to private savings. We assume 
that these solutions are neither available nor desirable options for the euro area. Actually, the price stability ob-
jective and the ban of privileged government market access in the EU Treaty limit these exits from public debt.  
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all creditors (and hence equates ex ante-risks for investors), there is a detrimental first mover 
advantage. It pays off to “rush to the exit” (Roubini and Setser, 2004). By contrast, a defined 
procedure offers the prospect that, in case of illiquidity, rules will ensure equal treatment of 
creditors. This prospect can be a stabilizing factor in itself. 
Pre-defined procedures can also address a second collective-action-problem: In ad hoc-
negotiations, single creditors have an incentive to refuse a debt settlement (holdout-problem) 
and to insist on full repayment through litigation, which in turn decreases the willingness and 
thus the probability of all other creditors to accept the debt exchange. In the case of Argenti-
na, the holdout-strategy of specialized vulture funds recently proved to be successful once 
again since US courts decided in their favour (Committee on International Economic Policy 
and Reform, 2013, Chapter 3). This current experience further encourages the existing disin-
centives to accept a restructuring offer. The underlying coordination problem creates uncer-
tainties and delays, resulting in further increasing indebtedness and unnecessary crisis escala-
tions characterized by dwindling reserves, capital flight and output losses (Krueger, 2002; 
International Monetary Fund, 2013). Compared to an ad hoc approach, a properly designed 
insolvency regime can reduce the chances of holdout-strategies. It can shorten the duration of 
negotiations and it also may reduce other costs since “markets prefer the certainty of debt re-
structuring to the uncertainty of an ad hoc process with no imminent resolution of the under-
lying debt problem” (Mody, 2013: 16).  
CACs, which state that a qualified majority of bond holders can take decisions binding for all 
bond holders, may alleviate but not necessarily solve these collective-action-problems entire-
ly. Conventional CACs can only constrain holders of one single bond issue but not all debtors 
of one country. Holdout-strategists can buy majorities (or blocking minorities) of single bond 
issues and litigate for full repayment. Even if that problem can be tackled through aggregation 
clauses in CACs, these clauses do not offer any hint as to the trigger of restructuring, the  time 
perspective of negotiations, the expected loss in case these clauses were to be used or ways of 
interim financing during negotiations. In sum, improved CACs may be a reasonable comple-
ment to a full insolvency procedure but they are certainly no substitute.   
Finally, a statutory insolvency procedure would also reduce uncertainty regarding payment 
moratoria during the time of negotiations and the extent of financial assistance as well as its 
conditionality. Both creditors and debtors would profit from the reduction of this type of un-
certainty because the debtor country could not sell or destroy asset values as long as the nego-
tiations are under way and the creditor would be fully informed about potential financial as-
sistance and its conditions – information that is highly relevant for the negotiations and the 
related decision-making of investors. 
While the aforementioned aspects apply to any regional context with a large number of credi-
tors, the specific circumstances and recent experiences of the euro area strengthen the case for 
a defined procedure even more. The lack of any provisions to deal with sovereign insolvency 
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created massive uncertainties for Greece’s creditors in 2009/2010. The Greek insolvency be-
came obvious in 2010. At that time, bond holders had no information about applicable proce-
dures, the realistic final loss in case of a Greek default or the time perspective for a settlement. 
This uncertainty created a massive rush to the exit with immediate contagion to other country 
segments in the euro area government bond markets.  
The fact that a PSI was eventually achieved for Greece in 2012 does hardly point towards the 
merits of ad hoc negotiations (Zettelmeyer, Trebesch und Gulati, 2013). The long delay be-
tween the point in time that Greece lost its bond market access and the implementation of the 
PSI was effectively financed by taxpayers in other euro countries. Maturing Greek bonds and 
the continuing primary deficit were covered by the new European loan facilities (bilateral 
loans from euro area partners and loans from the European Financial Stability Facility). The 
long lasting uncertainties about a sustainable Greek debt settlement added to the dramatic and 
persistent decline of the real economy. Furthermore, the Greek PSI constitutes a precedent 
which has even aggravated the collective-action-problems for future euro area cases: Majority 
holders of single Greek bonds who refused to participate in the PSI have been treated gener-
ously and achieved full repayment.  
Apart from the Greek experience, general features of the euro area underline the need for 
well-defined procedures (Gianviti et al., 2010). European conditions are characterized by high 
real and financial integration of national economies, very high public debt levels (relative to 
world GDP) and a particular investor structure (with a heavy involvement of euro area finan-
cial institutions). All these features increase both the risks and complexities of any attempts of 
ad hoc restructurings. Therefore, relatively favourable experiences with ad hoc negotiations in 
the cases of insolvent developing or emerging economies (Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch, 
2012) hardly deliver relevant information for the euro area.  
One of the opponents’ political arguments against a global insolvency procedure like the Sov-
ereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM, see below) is the decisive role of multilateral 
institutions like the IMF and the implied reduction of national autonomy. Such arguments are 
significantly less relevant in the institutional context of the European Union and the euro area 
(Gianviti et al., 2010). In the ongoing process of integration, member countries have already 
transferred substantial sovereignty to the European level. As a reaction to the debt crisis, they 
have accepted several new and far reaching constraints on fiscal policy, a European approach 
to banking and financial market supervision, and have established mutual loan facilities based 
on strict conditionality. At this advanced stage of integration, it can hardly be a problem in 





3. Survey of proposals for sovereign insolvency procedures 
The design of insolvency procedures is rooted in the proposals of statutory restructuring pro-
cedures for developing countries, which have been put forward since the 1980s (for surveys 
see e.g. Rogoff and Zettelmeyer, 2002; Das, Papaioannou and Trebesch, 2012; and IMF, 
2013). Here, we first review the most prominent proposal for the global sphere and then, in a 
second step, the recent proposals for the euro area (see Table 1 in the Appendix for a sum-
mary of the main elements of the reviewed proposals and a comparison to our VIPS pro-
posal). 
These designs for the handling of sovereign insolvencies have in common that they aim at 
arrangements which, in future, could cope with unsustainable debt levels. They do not claim 
to offer advice for an acute debt crisis and the challenge of unsustainable debt in a highly 
fragile financial environment. For the latter problem, models like the PADRE (“Politically 
Acceptable Debt Restructuring in the Eurozone”) plan by Pâris and Wyplosz (2014) or the 
European Debt Redemption Pact as proposed by the German Council of Economic Advisors 
(2011) can be an option. These or similar strategies are designed as exceptional one-off solu-
tions to overcome the legacy of over-indebtedness. By contrast, insolvency regimes rather aim 
to establish a permanent institutional setup which would (re-)establish market discipline once 
and for all, thereby preventing fiscal crises from arising again in the future. One-off ap-
proaches to cope with excessive legacy debt could well be combined with the introduction of 
a permanent insolvency regime but are not the focus of this contribution.  
We furthermore limit our survey to those insolvency procedures which are based on negotia-
tions between creditors and sovereign debtors. Hence, we disregard details of sovereign con-
tingent convertible bonds, which would completely automatize restructurings conditional on 
certain quantified criteria (mainly certain public debt-to-GDP thresholds) as suggested by 
Barkbu, Eichengreen, and Mody (2012) in a global and Mody (2013) in a European context. 
 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) 
A milestone in the debate and the most prominent model so far is the Sovereign Debt Restruc-
turing Mechanism (SDRM) developed by Anne O. Krueger (2002). The SDRM was supposed 
to be established under the control of the IMF. However, the amendment to the IMF’s Arti-
cles of Agreement, which had already been accepted by its board of governors, was never 
implemented (see Gianviti et al., 2010, for a summary on the debate over this proposal).  
The proposal is partly based on the existing insolvency procedures for municipalities in the 
United States (Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code) arguing that a sovereign insolvency 
procedure must be designed differently from procedures for private debtors. Most important-
ly, the carrying out of basic governmental functions must be guaranteed and, moreover, liqui-
dation is no viable alternative in the municipal and sovereign context. 
8 
 
Krueger (2002) proposes four main elements of an SDRM to warrant equal treatment of all 
creditors and preserve asset values: First of all and most importantly, she stresses the necessi-
ty of majority decisions (including aggregation across debt instruments) to overcome the col-
lective action problem. Second, Krueger calls for a stay on creditor enforcement as well as 
payment moratoria while negotiations are underway in order to ensure that these negotiations 
cannot be undermined by legal actions on the part of single creditors. Third, creditor interests 
must be protected by prohibiting the servicing of any junior claims. Furthermore, the sover-
eign debtor would have to ensure that it would not conduct any policy which might destroy 
existing asset values. As an example, Kruger refers to the potentially necessary implementa-
tion of capital controls during the time of negotiations in order to prevent capital flight. 
Fourth, any potential provision of new money during negotiations should be facilitated and 
incentivized by ensuring that these new credit lines would be senior to all pre-existing debt. 
Through the implementation of the SDRM, the IMF was to become the main institution for 
supervising and financing debt restructurings. The transition process towards full implementa-
tion did not receive much attention in the SDRM proposal. When designing the SDRM, the 
focus was on the situation of developing and emerging countries, where the perspective of 
debt restructuring is less sensitive for global systemic stability than in the case of euro area 
countries. 
By its nature, the SDRM does not take into account the specific European conditions. Never-
theless, many proposals for the European context including VIPS refer to original ideas of the 
SDRM. All of these “European” models share the common understanding that some kind of 
procedure for sovereign insolvency is an indispensable element for the euro area architecture. 
In the absence of any procedure, the newly established system of liquidity assistance through 
the ESM and the European Central Bank is at risk to degenerate into a system of permanent 
transfers with substantial disincentives for prudent fiscal behaviour. Naturally, the earlier pro-
posals could have been more creative with respect to institution building while the more re-
cent ones then took newly established institutions like the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) as given and as a building block for an insolvency procedure.  
 
European Monetary Fund (EMF) 
Gros and Mayer (2010) propose the establishment of a European Monetary Fund (EMF) 
which is supposed to provide conditional guarantees or loans to countries in need and manage 
a potential restructuring of the sovereign debt in question. Euro countries would capitalize the 
fund through weighted contributions which increase with the debt- and deficit-to-GDP levels 
once they violated the Maastricht criteria. Countries facing illiquidity, in a first step, could 
obtain EMF funds up to the amount they contributed, if their fiscal adjustment program had 
previously been approved by the Eurogroup. In a second step, that is in case the country 
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would be in need of further funding, it could call on more funds, if it agreed to a customized 
adjustment program supervised by the European Commission (EC) and the Eurogroup.  
In case none of the liquidity aid measures was effective, the proposal would allow for the re-
structuring of sovereign debt. The haircut should reduce the debt level to the Maastricht level 
of 60% of GDP. The remaining debt would be guaranteed by exchanging national debt 
against claims on the EMF, which would follow the construction of Brady bonds and which 
would credibly limit the losses of investors.  
The proposal does not suggest specific precautions against the hold-out problem and litiga-
tion. It does not refer to the transition problem, either. However, restructuring with the help of 
the EMF could only take place in the future, i.e. once the members’ contributions have capi-
talized the funds of the EMF to a sufficient degree.  
 
European Crisis Resolution Mechanism (ECRM) 
The European Crisis Resolution Mechanism (ECRM) proposed in 2010 (Gianviti et al., 2010) 
has much in common with the SDRM but adapts it to European requirements. It consists of 
four main elements: First, euro area members would have to agree on a procedure to initiate 
negotiations between creditors and the debtor country. As Krueger states in her SDRM-
proposal, only the debtor country itself should be able to launch negotiations, which in turn 
would lead to a moratorium of payments and a stay on any ongoing litigation until the negoti-
ations were to be concluded. Second, the decisions made by a qualified majority of the capital 
(aggregated across all debt issues in question) would be binding for all creditors. Third, nego-
tiations should be supervised or moderated by a politically independent judicial body. The 
authors propose a newly created chamber at the European Court of Justice for this “first 
body”. The “second body” would provide analytical and financial assistance. These responsi-
bilities could be taken up by the European Commission for the analytical part and a perma-
nent version of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) for the financial assistance 
(which would now be the ESM). The ECRM-proposal does not contain any detailed discus-
sion about the extent of restructurings but wants to limit the mechanism to cases where debt 
has reached a “truly unsustainable” level. Furthermore, the ECRM does not pay any attention 
to the challenges of transition towards the new regime, either.  
 
EEAG-Proposal for a New Crisis Mechanism for the Euro Area 
In 2011, the EEAG (European Economic Advisory Group, 2011) suggested a New Crisis 
Mechanism for the Euro Area. As the establishment of the ESM had already been under way 
at the time, the EEAG sees the ESM as the central institution to provide rescue funds and su-
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pervise fiscal adjustment programs. Their proposal of a three-stage procedure for Eurozone 
members in financial distress refers to different degrees of crises. 
In case of (short-term) “illiquidity” – i.e. in the expectation that a country will be able to re-
finance itself at acceptable conditions in the near future – a euro area member country should 
be supported by means of short-term loans with a maximum maturity of two years provided 
by the ESM. The maximum volume should only cover a deficit that is in line with the Maas-
tricht criteria and the country would have to undergo fiscal reforms in order to balance its 
budget. The loans should be senior to any commercial claims and they should be collateral-
ized by marketable state property, such that these loans would not end up being outright trans-
fers. After having received two years of fiscal aid, the country would not be eligible anymore 
for assistance throughout the following five years. Should it nevertheless need new funds, it 
would have to declare “pending insolvency” and thereby would reach the next step.  
In case of “pending insolvency”, the authors first rely on a market solution. However, in order 
to make this solution viable, all bonds should contain CACs with aggregation rules in order to 
overcome the collective action problem (which is why they push for a prompt implementation 
of CACs). The country would have to negotiate a debt restructuring program with its private 
creditors within a limited negotiation period of two months, during which the ESM finances 
necessary governmental functions. In case no agreement could be reached, the ESM, the ECB 
and the IMF would be called into the negotiation process, which may take another two 
months. This time, however, there would be an automatic haircut in the nominal value of the 
bond. Only the size of the haircut would be subject to negotiation: It should, however, amount 
to at least 20% and at most 50% of the debt affected. The actual haircut would be based on the 
discount at which the bonds were traded on the secondary market during the two previous 
months. Just like Gros and Mayer (2010), the EEAG advocates Brady bond-type guarantees 
by the ESM of up to 80% of the new nominal value. The maximum exposure of the ESM 
should, however, amount to only half of the Maastricht debt ratio, i.e. to 30% of GDP.  
In the face of “actual insolvency”, i.e. if the country was still not able to refinance its debt on 
the market at acceptable conditions after a three year adjustment period, it would have to de-
clare an outright debt moratorium for all of its outstanding debt and renegotiate all outstand-
ing private debt. At this stage, the ESM would no longer provide financial assistance. To be 
precise, the ESM would only provide guaranteed replacement bonds for another three years 
and under strict compatibility with the Maastricht rules, if previous negotiations were success-
ful. 
Details of a transition period are not specified in the proposal. However, the proposal 
acknowledges the fact that the banking sector may still not be able to absorb large debt reduc-




European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime (ESDRR) 
The European Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime (ESDRR) suggested by the Committee 
on International Economic Policy and Reform (2013) takes advantage of the newly imple-
mented institutional framework of the euro area and the creation of the permanent ESM. Un-
like earlier designs it contains well elaborated legal details and precautions against holdout-
investors. The authors suggest defining the new procedure through an (already pre-
formulated) ESM Treaty change and assigning a central role to the restructuring procedure 
including liquidity aid by the ESM. 
Countries with a debt-to-GDP ratio of up to 60% (i.e. those in line with the Maastricht crite-
ria) which were to face illiquidity would receive unconditional liquidity aid from the ESM. 
Those countries with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60-90% would receive conditional funding and 
would quasi-automatically have to restructure their debt, if the debt sustainability analysis 
suggested outright insolvency. Countries facing illiquidity/insolvency and having a debt-to-
GDP ratio of over 90% would receive funding only after a prior (automatic) restructuring had 
taken place. Any restructuring should result in a debt-to-GDP ratio below 90%. 
The ESM Treaty change would offer reliable protection against holdouts by granting the as-
sets and revenue streams of ESM program countries immunity from judicial processes as it 
had been recommended before (Krueger, 2002; Buchheit, Gulati und Tirado, 2013). Further-
more the treaty change would comprise a supermajority rule according to which a 75% con-
sent of bondholders’ capital aggregated across all issues would be a condition for an ESM 
endorsed restructuring.  
Compared to preceding proposals, the ESDRR has been developed with full awareness of the 
transition problem. The authors expect that, in the short run, their mechanism would trigger 
immediate instability and, therefore explicitly consider their model to be a mere long-term 
solution. A precondition for its full implementation is that all participating countries would 
have reduced their debt levels to a figure well below the upper threshold (of 90% of debt-to-
GDP). To tackle the problem of high legacy debt, the authors recommend to apply strategies 
like the European Debt Redemption Pact as proposed by the German Council of Economic 
Advisors (2011) or the PADRE plan by Pâris and Wyplosz (2014), which are both one-time 
mechanisms of debt restructurings that could achieve lower debt levels for euro area coun-
tries.5 
The ESDRR, with its detailed legal provisions and the mentioned awareness of the transition 
problem, advances the literature. However, it does not yet offer a strategy on how to cope 
                                                 
5 The employment of the “Politically Acceptable Debt Restructuring in the Eurozone (PADRE)” as a bridge has 
only been brought into play recently by Beatrice Weder di Mauro, who was one of the lead authors of the ES-
DRR (Weder di Mauro, 2014). 
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with time-inconsistency problems, which arise due to the postponement of the reform up to an 
uncertain date.  
 
4. VIPS: liquidity provision and insolvency procedure 
VIPS shares the understanding of the proposals described above that, under the conditions of 
EMU, a defined insolvency procedure is superior to reliance on ad hoc negotiations. It fur-
thermore follows the assessment in the ESDRR proposal (also put forward by Mody, 2013) 
that the establishment of any insolvency procedure is a risky phase. The financial environ-
ment in the euro area remains fragile, as the situation is still shaped by high public debt levels, 
a heavy exposure of (weak) European banks to their governments’ debt and a limited growth 
potential of the highly indebted economies. In such an environment, a sudden regime change 
could be seen as a signal for an imminent comprehensive debt restructuring and trigger a new 
acute crisis. 
VIPS tackles this difficulty through lagged implementation: The details of an insolvency pro-
cedure are defined today but the procedure will only become effective “in the long run”. To 
this end, VIPS comprises two components: first, a design of a sovereign insolvency procedure 
which is to be established in the future and, second, an explicit transition path, the “VIPS 
bridge”, into the “long-run” stage. In this section, we start with the description of the ultimate 
regime and describe the bridge in the next section. 
When designing an insolvency procedure for sovereigns the following fundamental decisions 
have to be taken: The procedure must comprise a trigger which defines the conditions under 
which the procedure is activated. It must define rules and set up institutions for the subsequent 
negotiations comprising the provision of liquidity in the negotiation phase. Specifically, the 
procedure should define how a decision on a haircut is to be taken and whether quantitative 
criteria can be defined to determine the extent of a debt restructuring. Furthermore, the insol-
vency procedure must credibly address the holdout problem and minimize the risk of lengthy 
and costly litigation. The VIPS insolvency procedure tackles these issues as follows (see Fig-









VIPS defines a trigger for the insolvency procedure in combination with modified rules for 
the provision of emergency liquidity through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM): Any 
euro area member state could continue to rely on ESM assistance according to the rules as 
they exist today, i.e. loans conditional on consolidation and reform measures. Furthermore, to 
prevent excessive and unnecessary use of liquidity assistance, the interest rate at which the 
ESM provides loans should reflect creditworthiness to some extent: The ESM could e.g. 
charge a small mark-up over the average interest rate for other euro area countries with simi-
lar debt levels, to cover for the risk (see also EEAG, 2011). 
A major difference compared to the current situation is that, under the VIPS rules, ESM assis-
tance is strictly limited to a period of three years, the “shelter period”. A time limit of that sort 
has been suggested by Fuest (2011) and is also roughly in line with the EEAG proposal 
(which suggests two years). It proved to be reasonable in the course of the euro area debt cri-
sis. Three years have been sufficient for a country like Ireland to launch substantial reforms, 
to leave ESM assistance and to return to the bond markets for new loans. Under the VIPS 
regime, liquidity assistance by the ESM definitely ends with the shelter period. After that, the 
debtor country has to choose between returning to the market and initiating the insolvency 
procedure. If the country does not consider market conditions for new bond issues to be ac-
ceptable the only remaining option is to trigger the opening of the procedure with the objec-
tive of restructuring its debt.6 The scheme would hardly encourage a reckless and “too early” 
                                                 
6 No matter how a sovereign insolvency procedure is designed, it must always be the debtor country which initi-
ates the insolvency procedure. An analogy to private insolvency where the debtor can be forced to declare bank-
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use of the insolvency procedure as an easy escape from high debt levels. Conditionality of the 
ESM’s liquidity assistance will indeed prevent any precipitous application for funds because 
it always comes at the expense of a substantial loss of autonomy. Equally, the defined rules 
for the (maximum) shelter period would address the converse problem that insolvency proce-
dures are often triggered “too late” (International Monetary Fund, 2013). 
The shelter period has several further merits: It prevents short-run market turbulences from 
forcing an immediate debt restructuring. Thus, it limits the damaging potential of a temporary 
bad equilibrium driven by market panics. It buys time to pursue a course of consolidation and 
reforms which makes the crisis country more resilient for returning to the market after three 
years. Moreover, the shelter period can lead to a higher level of available information on the 
fundamental situation of the debtor country which will make multiple equilibria less likely 
and, hence, reduce uncertainty (Morris and Shin, 2001). 
The time limit prevents a system designed primarily for liquidity assistance from degenerating 
into a permanent transfer mechanism. Moreover, the shelter period also helps to clarify the 
underlying causes for an acute liquidity problem. The theoretical distinction between a situa-
tion of panic-driven illiquidity and fundamental insolvency is hard to make in reality. If this 
decision was based on a simple debt-to-GDP threshold like in other proposals, it would be 
arbitrary and might provoke premature restructurings. The temporary protection over three 
years with the VIPS procedure will be highly informative. If a government, in spite of three 
years of assistance, was unable to return to the market this could be seen as a strong indication 
for fundamental insolvency. 
Finally, the shelter period would reduce the risk of contagion (Fuest, 2011): If the activation 
of the insolvency procedure for one country is seen as a precedent for other euro countries 
some time thereafter, these other countries could benefit from the full shelter period them-
selves. Hence, the occurrence of multiple simultaneous restructurings and the resulting mas-
sive stress for financial stability could be avoided. 
 
Negotiations 
In the VIPS design, the ESM is the institution responsible to moderate negotiations between 
the debtor country and the creditors’ representatives (which is largely in line with the ESDRR 
proposal). For that purpose, the ESM establishes and heads a committee comprised of repre-
sentatives from the debtor country and the group of creditors. The ESM must have veto power 
in all restructuring decisions since its own loans from the shelter period are also at stake. 
                                                                                                                                                        
ruptcy when total liabilities exceed total assets is not applicable. The value of assets is unobservable for sover-
eign creditors and externally enforced liquidation of assets is inconsistent with principles of country sovereignty 
(Gianviti et al., 2010). 
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Through the ESM the interests of all guarantors (all euro member states) are represented. The 
ESM may rely for all negotiations and underlying analyses on the support of the “Troika” 
(European Central Bank, European Commission and International Monetary Fund) as it does 
today. A continuing involvement of the International Monetary Fund is no requirement for the 
procedure but may be desirable due to the Fund’s expertise. Here, the VIPS design is open for 
a differentiated institutional structure along the lines of the ECRM proposal which envisages 
different bodies. While the ESM is the body for the provision of financial assistance and is 
also the natural candidate to moderate negotiations, ECB and European Commission would 
be natural candidates to take up the analytical responsibility. 
The start of the procedure has the following consequences, which correspond to the main el-
ements of insolvency procedures like the SDRM proposal with the difference that the ESM 
steps in for the IMF in the SDRM blueprint: 
- With the start of negotiations an immediate moratorium on the debtor country’s debt ser-
vice takes effect. Exceptions leading to privileges for certain groups of creditors have to 
be limited to a minimum (e.g. multilateral lending) in order to protect the interests of the 
collective of creditors. 
- During the ongoing procedure any sequestration against the debtor is impermissible. 
- The ESM (possibly assisted by the Troika) is responsible for the supervision of the debtor 
country in order to prevent it from impairing the value of its assets. 
- During the negotiation phase, the ESM provides the liquidity which is necessary to guar-
antee basic governmental functions. The extent of this intermediate financing is defined in 
a bilateral agreement between the ESM and the debtor country. The maximum duration of 
this liquidity assistance is twelve months, which, consequently, is also the maximum time 
span restructuring negotiations may last. 
 
Extent of restructuring 
A predefined mechanical formula for the extent of a haircut is neither realistic nor conceptual-
ly convincing. Restructuring negotiations are subject to a complicated trade-off: A too modest 
debt relief may prevent the debtor country from returning to the bond market. And a too gen-
erous haircut would unduly impair the interests of the creditors. During the negotiations, it is 
the responsibility of the ESM (with the assistance of the Troika) to strike a balance between 
these two extremes and take account of the economic conditions of each single case.  
However, an insolvency procedure can offer a more effective expectation anchor, if it in-
cludes a rule which indicates the possible maximum loss. Similar to the EMF proposal the 
following rule should be enshrined in the VIPS procedure: Under no circumstances should the 
debt settlement push the debt-to-GDP ratio below the Maastricht reference value of 60%. 
Haircuts which leave the subsequent debt levels above 60% should remain possible, if the 
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debtor country – for example due to a favourable growth perspective or high assets – is 
deemed to be solvent with higher debt levels.7 Linking VIPS to the Maastricht debt-to-GDP 
reference value would not only stabilize expectations of the maximum loss in case of sover-
eign insolvency. It would also increase sensitivity for risk premia and increasing debt levels, 
in particular for levels exceeding the 60% limit. Market discipline and the reformed Stability 
and Growth Pact would then both consistently sanction debt levels above that limit. 
ESM loans from the shelter period have to be included into the debt restructuring, which is a 
fundamental difference compared to earlier proposals like the ESDRR or the EEAG proposal. 
We regard this taxpayer risk exposure as unavoidable. A preferred creditor status for ESM 
loans provided over the shelter period would damage the stabilization chances of that con-
struction. In case of seniority of ESM claims, the quality of private loans to a crisis country 
would continuously deteriorate with the increasing share of ESM loans. A similar problem 
occurred with the implicit seniority of Greek bonds purchased by the ECB since 2010 (which 
actually did not take part in the PSI in 2012, see Mody, 2013). VIPS’ shelter period can only 
fulfil its stabilization and diagnostic function, if ESM lending within this phase were not priv-
ileged compared to new loans from the private sector. The potential losses for the ESM (and, 
hence, taxpayers) should, however, be limited by appropriate rules on the maturity structure 
of government bonds which would limit the liquidity needs within the shelter period (see sec-
tion 5). 
The waiver for preferential treatment of ESM loans must only be ensured for the loans from 
the shelter period but not for the intermediate liquidity provided subsequently during the re-
structuring negotiations. These new loans should, in fact, have a preferred creditor status as 
they are provided only after the insolvency procedure has already been triggered and it there-
fore has become obvious that the crisis country does not suffer from a mere liquidity crisis.   
The simultaneous role of the ESM as a lender, moderator and veto player in the restructuring 
negotiations may give rise to conflicts of interest. As a lender, the ESM (and its guarantors, 
the euro member countries) has a self-interest to limit its losses and to strive for a (too) mod-
erate haircut. The more independent analytical assistance from the Troika may alleviate but 
hardly fully overcome these incentives. Also the experience with Greece points to the poten-
tial relevance of this conflict, where public creditors shy away from a second debt restructur-
ing although the high and further rising Greek debt-to-GDP level indicates insolvency. How-
                                                 
7 Here, VIPS diverges from the Gros and Mayer (2010) proposal who suggested cutting back debt levels to 60% 
in any case or the ESDRR which quantifies the target post-restructuring debt level at 60-90%. Automatisms of 
that kind would be too mechanical and problematic given the legitimate protection of investors against too far 
reaching cuts. The assumption underlying the one sided 60% limit is that any euro area country would be solvent 
with a public debt level of 60%. We regard this assumption as plausible in the long-run VIPS scenario in which 




ever, the rules created by VIPS would address this problem. A too moderate debt relief clearly 
failing to deliver a sustainable debt situation would impede a return to the bond market. 
Moreover, according to VIPS rules, ESM liquidity provision beyond the shelter period (plus 
12 months interim financing) does not exist. Specifically, the crisis country should not be al-
lowed to apply for continued or renewed ESM financing for a pre-specified number of years. 
For example, the European Economic Advisory Group (2011) proposes an analogous mini-
mum break of five years. In this setting, an insufficient haircut would provoke nothing but an 
unorderly default of the crisis country with all its uncertainties. This perspective implies a 
strong incentive for the ESM and the national governments of the euro area to agree on a suf-
ficiently far reaching extent of debt relief. 
 
Precautions against holdout-investors and litigation 
VIPS minimizes the risks and uncertainties from lengthy legal fights with holdout creditors by 
installing two precautions: first, the obligatory use of refined aggregation rules as an element 
in euro area CACs and, second, an adjustment of the ESM Treaty granting immunity of pro-
gram countries’ assets from any creditor attachment, thereby following the exact route of the 
ESDRR strategy.  
Since 2013, the ESM Treaty mandates CACs for all newly issued government bonds of euro 
countries (Benzler et al., 2012; Buchheit, Gulati und Tirado, 2013). These clauses define ma-
jorities of bond holders able to take binding restructuring decisions for all bond holders with 
the intention to preclude holdout-strategies. Standard CACs only define majorities for the 
individual bond issue and, therefore, are hardly effective in this regard. This merely brings the 
holdout problem to a different level instead of solving it once and for all. Even with limited 
capital, holdout investors could still buy blocking minorities of single smaller bond issues and 
successfully proceed with their strategy. Aggregation clauses can thwart potential holdouts 
since they define majorities across all bond issues whose decisions are binding for each single 
issue. Current euro area-CACs comprise aggregation features which would hardly contain 
holdouts. For an overall binding decision, not only a quorum of 75% of capital invested in the 
aggregate but also an additional majority of at least two thirds in each individual bond have to 
be achieved (Zettelmeyer, Trebesch und Gulati, 2013). With these weak features vulture funds 
could still easily accumulate bond volumes amounting to a blocking minority for a single is-
sue. 
For that reason, CACs as prescribed in the ESM Treaty must be revised through a stronger 
aggregation principle. Bond-by-bond quorums must be deleted completely with the aggregate 
quorum being the necessary and sufficient condition for binding creditor decisions, the aggre-
gate quorum should be reduced to two thirds of the capital invested. 
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The risk that lawsuits against a restructuring can be successful at courts in third countries (like 
the US) or would at least imply lengthy legal uncertainties can be addressed through a further 
adjustment of the ESM Treaty (Buchheit, Gulati und Tirado, 2013; Committee on Internation-
al Economic Policy and Reform, 2013). A new provision should grant immunity from creditor 
attachments to the assets of euro area countries which participate in an ESM-supported ad-
justment program.8  Such an amendment would be sufficient to comprehensively exclude le-
gal risks. 
 
5. VIPS: the bridge 
VIPS would expose private creditors of euro countries to significant potential losses, if these 
countries end up in insolvency. Hence, VIPS’ prompt and full implementation would possibly 
cause concerns about the quality of euro area government bonds in general. This regime 
change could induce new turbulences and market panics which might lead to a new acute debt 
crisis. Therefore, VIPS’ full effectiveness requires an environment which is resilient and 
characterized in the following way: 
- The European banking union needs to be established and fully operational. This implies, 
for instance, that national and European resolution funds are sufficiently capitalized. 
Banks are protected through higher equity ratios and a liability cascade clearly defines the 
hierarchy of liabilities of shareholders and creditors in case of failing banks. 
- Bank claims against sovereign debtors do no longer benefit from regulatory privileges. 
Claims vis-à-vis sovereigns have to be backed-up with equity just like claims vis-à-vis 
private debtors (of comparable creditworthiness) and are subject to the same rules in order 
to prevent risk concentration (like upper limits on large value credits). European banks 
have adjusted their lending to these new rules and, consequently, their balance sheets are 
no longer characterized by a massive exposure to their respective home country or other 
euro area countries.  
- Fiscal recovery has made considerable progress. Debt-to-GDP-ratios are down substan-
tially compared to crisis levels and reach maximum values in the range between 60% and 
100% for the most compromised countries. 
- The remaining public debt is financed with long average maturities. As a result, the annual 
refinancing need of euro countries is moderate, which reduces the risk of a bond market 
run and self-enforcing liquidity crises. At the same time, the long-run debt structure limits 
the maximum credit volumes required, if ESM financing is needed for the three year shel-
ter period. 
                                                 
8 See Buchheit, Gulati and and Tirado (2013, p. 8) for a precise suggestion for the wording of a respective new 
article taken up by the Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform (2013, p. 40). 
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- A significant part of (but not necessarily the total) volume of debt would need to be pene-
trated by the above mentioned refined CACs with a stronger aggregation principle in or-
der to prevent hold-out strategies on single bonds issues.  
In such an environment, the conditionality of ESM liquidity funding as well as the maximum 
duration of the shelter period would indeed be credible because systemic risks of a sovereign 
debt restructuring at the end of the shelter period is significantly reduced. 
Obviously, the current situation is still far from being shaped by such resilience. Under the 
fragile current conditions, the insolvency of a medium-sized or even small euro area country 
would imply substantial systemic risks even though VIPS includes precautions like the shelter 
period. However, delaying any reform and waiting for better times is no option, as the lacking 
perspective on how to deal with an insolvent euro member country is a risk factor in itself. 
VIPS’ solution for that dilemma is based on the principle of lagged implementation through 
the construction of a transition path, the “VIPS bridge”. Other concepts lack this bridge. Even 
the ESDRR, which pays attention to the transition problem, simply delays any reform until 
the legacy debt problem has been dealt with (Committee on International Economic Policy 
and Reform, 2013) – a solution which is obviously confronted with time inconsistency prob-
lems and lacking credibility. 
By contrast, VIPS pays close attention to the time inconsistency problem. The VIPS bridge 
fosters immediate irreversibility by setting the course for the new regime already today. Such 
a model of lagged implementation creates precedents for the future and makes use of the cur-
rent crisis-related opportunity to implement reforms (Buchanan, 1994) without destabilizing 
the currently still fragile financial situation. 
A critical condition for the success of lagged implementation is the irreversibility of the re-
form decision. With the approaching deadline for full effectiveness of the pre-announced new 
regime, resistance could grow and finally impede full implementation. Against the backdrop 
of this strategic difficulty, VIPS offers the following guarantees as a bridge into the long-run 





Figure 2: VIPS – the bridge 
 
 
The insolvency procedure as described in the preceding section would be codified in all de-
tails through an amendment of the ESM Treaty already today. In this amendment, one article 
stipulates that this defined insolvency procedure only takes effect on a pre-specified date. 
Hence the phasing-in of the new regime would be determined through international law and 
the unanimity requirement for any treaty changes offers protection against later reversals. 
The date for full implementation is to be defined in the following way: The VIPS insolvency 
regime becomes fully effective no later than a fixed date (e.g. starting with the year 2030) or 
earlier, if the average euro area government debt-to-GDP ratio has fallen below a critical val-
ue (e.g. 80% from currently 96%) and the European Resolution Fund for banks has reached a 
certain well-defined capitalization level. Further quantifiable criteria relating, e.g., to bank 
capitalization could be added. It is crucial that such conditions are quantifiable without any 
significant margin of interpretation.  
The fixed date defines the latest possible date for the regime change. It has the function of a 
fall back condition in case politicians would try to strategically delay the fulfilment of the 
quantifiable criteria. A criteria-guided effectiveness of the insolvency procedure clearly is the 
preferable scenario. It would imply that the full VIPS implementation occurs in a friendly 
financial and fiscal environment. Times in which public debt levels fall tend to be times in 
which government bond markets are stable. Compared to that, a fixed pre-determined date 
implies large uncertainty on the specific market situation and, as a consequence, a larger risk 
of destabilization. Nevertheless, the fixed date is an unavoidable fall back condition to safe-
guard the ultimate irreversibility of the regime change against political criteria manipulations. 
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Additionally, both politicians and investors know exactly when the regime change will come 
eventually. Therefore they then can adapt their expectations and act accordingly. 
The transitory phase of the ESM Treaty change and the final full effectiveness of VIPS in the 
future must not be misunderstood as a phase during which restructurings of sovereign debt are 
precluded. Certainly, ad hoc restructurings as in the case of Greece remain an available option 
throughout the transition path, which is defined by the VIPS bridge. The ESM Treaty change 
must avoid any contents which could be (mistakenly) seen as a signal for guarantees against 
restructurings in that transitory phase.9 However, the ultimate frameworks of VIPS can only 
be fully available with the end of the transitory phase. 
The immediate ESM Treaty change would be an important but not the only precaution against 
the time inconsistency problem. Several accompanying measures would emphasize the irre-
versibility of the transition path starting today. 
With immediate effectiveness, the ESM Treaty change would define a more convincing ag-
gregation clause as an obligatory element of euro area CACs for all government bonds issued 
in the future. The fact, that the prescription of CACs through the ESM Treaty was possible 
even in the middle of the acute phase of the debt crisis indicates that their modification and 
refinement would hardly imply severe risks for bond market stability. Nevertheless, this re-
form would create important preconditions for the future insolvency procedure. 
The ESM Treaty change should also include precise prescriptions for the maturity structure of 
new government debt issues. Even though long maturities are in the self-interest of each euro 
country there is a justification for externally imposed constraints. Short average maturities 
increase the vulnerability for liquidity crises. For VIPS, they imply a larger credit requirement 
over the shelter period and, as a consequence, a larger credit risk for the partner countries. 
Rules on minimum maturities are a natural reaction to counter the disincentives originating 
from these fiscal externalities. Furthermore, higher interest rates related to longer maturities 
may also have a disciplining effect with respect to the problem of over-borrowing.10 
The transitory phase towards full VIPS effectiveness should go hand in hand with the phas-
ing-out of regulatory privileges for sovereign debtors with respect to bank and insurance capi-
tal requirements. The latter faces challenges similar to the immediate effectiveness of an in-
solvency procedure. An abrupt change in the regulatory regime could lead to new downward 
                                                 
9 In this regard, no grandfathering clauses for bonds issued before the full effectiveness of the insolvency proce-
dure must be granted. Once the final VIPS provisions are fully effective all future restructurings would relate to 
all outstanding bonds. 
10 Contingent maturity extension defined in bond contracts could be a substitute for maturity regulations. 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2008, p. 73), for example, favors an automatic maturity extension of three years, if a 
country receives ESM funding. This would confine the risks borne by the ESM.  
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spirals at government bond markets. Nonetheless, the cautious phasing-out of these privileges 
with a long transitory period is possible and could be initiated immediately. 
Thus, the credibility of the VIPS bridge is firmly grounded on two pillars: first, the precise 
determination of full VIPS effectiveness through a change in the ESM Treaty which employs 
the commitment devices of international law, and, second, immediate reforms which already 
launch the (quasi-) irreversible regime change. 
 
6. Conclusions 
VIPS is designed under the assumption that no agreement on a common centralized fiscal 
policy regime, backed up by a transfer union, can be reached in the euro area. Therefore it 
proposes a bridge towards a more consistent institutional architecture based on the principles 
of national budgetary autonomy.  
Particularly, it offers a model to deal with insolvent member countries in the future while pay-
ing attention to the current fragility. It avoids any abrupt institutional change at present, but 
does not simply delay reforms for an indeterminate duration. It makes use of the reform mo-
mentum of the current crisis to initiate a cautious but steady and irreversible reform transition. 
Of course, chances for the model’s political realization are uncertain. The current temporary 
calming of the situation may already dampen the sense of urgency and therefore the readiness 
for reforms. Governments are always reluctant to accept reforms which would increase finan-
cial market constraints for their borrowing. On the other hand, VIPS promotes a responsible 
use of deficit finance: for countries with sustainable debt levels it offers reliable protection 
against the risks of liquidity crises. Furthermore, its construction is fully consistent with the 
new euro area fiscal governance (reformed Stability and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Com-
pact). All of these innovations stress the Maastricht 60%-objective for the debt-to-GDP level 
and, under VIPS, no restructuring threat exists for countries which respect that objective. 
Hence, political resistance against VIPS is inconsistent assuming that governments take the 
recent reforms of fiscal rules seriously. Apart from that, the lagged implementation inherent 
in VIPS is helpful to overcome potential political resistance: By accepting VIPS and the VIPS 
bridge, today’s governments would not tie their own hands but their (distant) successors. In 
addition, they would have at least some incentives to abstract from the current, narrow inter-
ests of their own countries and place more emphasis on general stability issues. This should 
help to foster consent. 
Without a clear insolvency procedure, the euro area would continue becoming a hardly func-
tional hybrid: A large degree of national budgetary autonomy combined with collective guar-
antees of de facto unlimited extent provided by fiscal and monetary authorities. This incon-
sistent institutional setting would imply massive disincentives and substantial risks for finan-
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Appendix – Table 1: Summary of Proposals 




Legal basis Key  
institution(s) 
Liquidity provision Seniority of 
liquidity 
provisions 













IMF Financing by IMF 
conditional on adoption 
of economic policy 
framework 
Yes Debtor request + ac-
ceptance by qualified 







um and stay on all 
litigation 




Gros and Mayer 
(2010) 






Stage I:  EMF guarantees 
(up to country’s own 
contribution) conditional 
on fiscal adjustment 
program  
Stage II: EMF guaran-
tees (above country’s 
own contribution) condi-
tional on implementation 
of tailor-made adjust-
ment program  
No details No details No details Haircut should decrease 
debt-GDP-level to 60%, 
use of Brady-bond-type 
EMF bond to guarantee 








Gianviti et al. (2010) 





EFSF in original 
text)  
Short- to medium term 
financial aid by ESM 
conditional on achieve-
ment of agreement 
between debtor and 
creditors reestablishing 
solvency 
No details ECJ opens procedure 
after debtor request + 
acceptance by qualified 
majority of creditors + 











No details No details 
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Legal basis Key  
institution(s) 
Liquidity provision Seniority of 
liquidity 
provisions 




Extent of restructuring Transition problem 
EEAG-Proposal 
(New Crisis Mecha-









with ECB and 
IMF) 
Three-step-procedure 
(see text for details), 
strict time limitations for 
liquidity assistance 
General rule: Loans and 
guarantees may never 
surpass 30% of country’s 
GDP 
Yes Extreme debt level 
(120% debt-GDP) or 
liquidity aid after time 
limit could not restore 
market access. 
 
Modified CACs for 
all government 
bonds – majority 
rule applies to all 
bonds maturing at 
the same time 
Size of haircuts guided 
by discounts observed in 
markets, use of Brady-
bond-type “replacement 
bonds” with EMF guar-










nomic Policy Reform 
(2013) 
Euro area ESM 
Treaty 
ESM ESM provides liquidity:  
Unconditionally if 
debt/GDP < 60%;  
Conditionally if 
debt/GDP 60-90%; 
only with prior restruc-
turing if debt/GDP > 
90%  
Yes When debt/GDP > 90% 
and liquidity crisis;  
when debt/GDP 60-90% 




Approval by ESM 
Immunization of to-
be-restructured debt  
Aggregation CACs 
Restructuring must result 
in debt/GDP < 90% 
(short-term debt subject 
to higher haircut) 
Treaty change 
postponed until 
legacy debt problem 







Euro area ESM 
Treaty 
ESM ESM provides loans over 












Inability to access mar-
ket after shelter period 
Immunization of to-
be-restructured debt  
Aggregation CACs 
Restructuring would not 
decrease debt/GDP to 
below 60% 
Immediate ESM 
Treaty change with 
transition clause; 
VIPS bridge 
 
